In this paper we introduce a cooperative attribute-based access control mechanism, which is specifically designed for enterprise computing systems. In our system, users are divided into different groups and they are affiliated with different attributes. Only members from the same group can combine their signing keys to form the signing key of a larger union set of attributes, but users from different groups cannot make it. With the union of the attributes, users can generate a signature which can be used to grant access right to the enterprise cloud system. The applications range from private cloud of a small and medium enterprise (SME) to a large public cloud of electronic healthcare system. We give an efficient design of this mechanism, formally prove its security and implement the prototype of our scheme.
Introduction
Enterprise computing is the paradigm of information processing and knowledge management in large businesses, organisations and enterprises. It is an information system which is constructed to support the operation and management of a company or organisation. Its main purpose is to improve efficiency and results in cost saving, which can help to utilise the overall operation of an enterprise. Quoted from Beattie (2012) , there are five major needs of large organisations that enterprise computing should be designed for: 1 "A high level of reliability, including built-in redundancies to ensure that a business can continue to operate if one system fails." 2 "A high level of security, including database security and the ability to set varied access profiles for specific users." 3 "A central data storage system that collects and organises data from the entire organisation and controls access to the data according to security protocols." 4 "The ability to add and customise applications as needed, giving them the necessary access to data in a relatively painless way." 5 "A high level of availability so that users are not waiting to access IT assets."
Recently a new technology called cloud computing brings a lot of advantages to business and enterprise . Enterprise cloud computing allows a business to benefit from this emerging technology while retaining systems to the specific needs of an enterprise, namely cost reduction, efficiency and collaboration. However, as the technology is relatively new, a lot of research and planning is required to make it work well. In this paper, we focus on the security side [(2) and (3) needs mentioned above] of enterprise computing, especially in the stream of enterprise cloud computing.
Attribute-based systems
In an enterprise, users are usually affiliated with some attributes. For example, a staff member may affiliate with {sex, year of birth, department, position, nationality}. This can facilitate the information management of users. Access right to some internal information systems or data cloud storage can be controlled easily according to the attributes of users. Attribute-based signatures (ABS) (Maji et al., 2008 ) is a versatile primitive that allows a party to sign a message with fine-grained control over identity information. In ABS, a signer, who possesses a set of attributes and receives the corresponding private key from the attribute authority, can sign a message with a predicate that is satisfied by his/her attributes. Under this notion, a signature is no longer attesting to the identity of the signer, but a claim regarding the attributes the underlying signer has. It is an excellent tool for enterprise computing system to provide attribute-based access control for its users.
Particularly, ABS can hide the attributes used to satisfy the claim-predicate and thus the identity information about the signer. For example, let a predicate Υ be 'A AN D (B OR C)'. Alice with attributes {A, B} can generate a signature on this predication. Bob with attributes {A, C}, who also satisfies this predicate, can create valid signatures as well. Owing to privacy protection of ABS, the signature produced by Bob and the one produced by Alice are indistinguishable, i.e., one cannot tell who the signature producer is or which attributes were used to produce the signature.
Collusion resistance is another essential security property of ABS. It means that users cannot collude to pool their attributes together. In other words, even if multiple users collude by merging their attributes (and the corresponding private keys), they cannot produce a signature to satisfy a predicate which none of them are able to satisfy individually. Therefore, in existing designs of ABS, users must sign individually by using their own attributes to satisfy the claim-predicate. But in the real life, there are situations where users need to (conditionally) cooperate and merge their attributes.
Cooperative access control in large enterprise
In some large companies or organisations, users are further divided into several groups such as different teams in a department. Users from the same team may need to cooperate to combine their attributes so that they can access the sensitive data stored in the cloud or get the service provided by the cloud that may require permissions from more than one user. Conversely, users from different teams cannot collude to merge their attributes and produce valid signatures. For instance, an employee Bob from team g 1 wants to access the financial information of a project in the private cloud server, and the access must be authorised by predicate Υ: 'Team Leader AN D (Financial Officer OR Accountant)'. Then David (with the attribute 'Team Leader' and a group identity 'g 1 ') and Fanny (with the attribute 'Financial Officer' and a group identity 'g 1 ') need to pool their attributes together to authorise the access for Bob. Note that an underlying requirement is that David (from group g 1 ) and Shelley (from group g 2 ) with attribute 'Financial Officer' cannot collude to authorise the access. That is, users from different groups cannot collude with each other to produce a valid access right for a given predicate.
Consider another situation in a hospital. In order to let different clinics and hospitals share the same database of patients, a centralised health cloud system is preferred. Attribute-based access control is deployed so that only a user with a certain set of attribute can access the data stored in the cloud. In this way, privacy of patients can be preserved. Assume there is a patient who has problems with his heart and his lung. He requires a cardiologist and a pulmonologist to jointly diagnose his case since it is a complicated and serious disease. The policy of his attribute-based access is authorised by predicate Υ: 'Cardiologist AN D Pulmonologist'. However, there is no individual doctor who is specialist in both cardiology and pulmonology. If normal attribute-based access control system is used, no one will satisfy this policy. In the reality, there are usually two doctors to jointly diagnose this patient. Thus it is reasonable to allow one cardiologist and one pulmonologist from the same group 'g 1 ' (e.g., the same hospital) to jointly collaborate to access this patient's health record in the cloud system.
With this in mind, we propose and define a variant of ABS: group-oriented attribute-based signatures (GO-ABS). In this new notion, we divide users by groups. Only members from the same group can merge their signing keys, but users from different groups cannot make it. It means that users from the same group are able to cooperate with each other by producing ABS for a given predicate (as long as the predicate is satisfied by their attributes), but users from different groups cannot collude.
Our contributions
In this paper, we first define the concept of GO-ABS. The most distinctive feature of GO-ABS is:
• Compared with normal ABS, GO-ABS provides more flexibility that users from the same group can pool their signing keys together and produce a signature to satisfy a new predicate where none of them is able to satisfy individually.
We define a rigorous security model of GO-ABS (i.e., perfect privacy and existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message and attribute set attacks), which are informally described as below:
• Perfect Privacy: If a scheme satisfies perfect privacy, the signatures obtained by the scheme satisfying the same claim-predicate have the same distribution. In other words, signatures produced by a single user and by a group of users who cooperate to merge their attributes are indistinguishable, as long as his/her attributes and the union of the users' attribute sets both satisfy the same claim-predicate.
• Unforgeability: The feature of unforgeability requires that:
1 users (regardless they are from the same group or different groups) cannot forge a signature with a predicate that the union of their attribute sets do not satisfy 2 users from different group, even they pool their attributes together and the union of their attribute sets satisfy the predicate, they cannot produce a valid signature either.
We further provide an efficient construction of GO-ABS. The formal analysis shows that our construction is secure under our security definition. In addition, we also analyse the efficiency of our proposed GO-ABS construction in terms of time complexity. We simulate the performance of the scheme by testing the running time of various basic operations based on a pairing-based library. The results of experiment are given. We believe our solution is practical and suitable for large scale enterprise cloud computing system.
Related work
As cloud computing becomes prevalent, more and more sensitive data is being centralised into the cloud for sharing, which brings new challenges for data security and privacy. Apart from the ABS (ABE), attribute-based encryption (ABE) is also a promising cryptographic primitive, which has been widely applied to design fine-grained access control systems. The concept of ABE was first introduced by Sahai and Waters (2005) . In an ABE system, user secret keys and ciphertexts are labelled with sets of descriptive attributes. A user is allowed to decrypt the ciphertext only if there is a match between the attributes of the ciphertext and the secret key. Li et al. (2011) improved the efficiency of ABE and coined the notion of hierarchical ABE (HABE), which can be viewed as the generalisation of traditional ABE in the sense that both definitions are equal when all attributes are independent. Their construction exhibits significant improvements over the traditional ABE when attribute hierarchies exist. Other works have discussed similar problems to improve the efficiency of ABE. presented a generic and efficient solution to implement attribute-based access control systems by introducing secure outsourcing techniques into ABE. proposed a new secure outsourced ABE system, which supported both secure outsourced key-issuing and decryption. In addition, the construction provided checkability of the outsourced computation results in an efficient way.
ABS was first introduced in the form of attribute-based group signatures (Khader, 2007a (Khader, , 2007b . This primitive hides only the identity of the signer, but reveals the attributes which the signer used to satisfy the predicate. It also allows a group manager to identify the signer of any signature [which is similar to the semantics of group signatures (Chaum and Van Heyst, 1991) ].
As a related notion to ABS, ID-based signature was proposed and formalised in Ma (2014) and Zhang et al. (2013) , which enables users to generate signature with their identities. Identity-based group signature allows any member of a group to sign on behalf of the group without revealing his identity. Recently, Feng and Li (2014) also proposed a related notion called certificate-based digital signature.
The first formalisation of ABS was given by Maji et al. (2008 Maji et al. ( , 2011 . Since that, ABS has received much attention. Recently, a number of ABS schemes have been proposed and applied to various kinds of new network environment. For example, Su et al. (2014) constructed a novel ABS scheme for the internet of things (IoT) that uses an attribute tree and expresses any policy consisting of AND, OR threshold gates under the computational Diffie-CHellman problem. Other works proposed in recent years have described some new notions about ABS schemes (Liu et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014) . The exiting schemes can be divided into three categories according to the structure of access policy:
• ABS for single threshold structure (such as Kumar et al., 2010; Li and Kim, 2010; Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009; Herranz et al., 2012) . For instance, Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini (2009) proposed threshold attribute-based signatures (t-ABS). In a t-ABS, signers are associated with a set of attributes. Verification of a signature with an associated attribute set succeeds if the signer has a threshold number of (at least t) attributes in common with the verification attribute set. Siamak et al. formalised the security of t-ABS and proposed two schemes: the first one is only selectively unforgeable and the second one is existentially unforgeable. Both schemes are provable in the standard model assuming hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Recently, there are several attempts of constructing efficient t-ABS (Gagné et al., 2013) , in which, they constructed a new (t-ABS) scheme that is more efficient than previous t-ABS schemes.
• ABS for monotone access structure (such as Maji et al., 2008 Maji et al., , 2011 Wang et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2012; Escala et al., 2011; Ge et al., 2012) Maji et al. (2011) . Then they presented three practical instantiations based on groups with bilinear pairing operations. Further, they gave a construction which is secure even against a malicious attribute authority, although the security for this scheme was proven in the generic group model.
• ABS for non-monotone access structure (such as Takashima, 2011, 2013) Okamoto and Takashima (2011) . Their proposed scheme is the first to support general non-monotone predicates. The security of the proposed ABS scheme was proven under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption and the existence of collision resistant (CR) hash functions.
In our construction the attribute claim-predicate is expressed as a monotone-span program.
Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries required by this paper. Section 3 describes our proposed security models of GO-ABS and the definitions for GO-ABS. Section 4 is the detailed construction. Its security analysis is given in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyse the efficiency of the proposed GO-ABS scheme in terms of time complexity. We conclude this paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Group with bilinear pairings
Let G, H, G T be cyclic (multiplicative) groups of prime order p. g is a generator of G and h is a generator of H. A bilinear pairing e : G × H → G T has the following properties:
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u ∈ G and v ∈ H. The bilinear pairings, such as modified Weil or Tate pairings, can be obtained from certain elliptic curves (Boneh et al., 2001 ).
Monotone span programs
A claim-predicate is a monotone Boolean function. Firstly, we show how to convert a Boolean formula into an equivalent linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) matrix using the method described in Lewko and Waters (2011) . We consider the Boolean formula as an access tree (Goyal et al., 2006) , where interior nodes are AN D and OR gates and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes. We begin by labelling the root node of the tree with vector (1) (a vector of length 1). We then go down the levels of the tree, labelling each node with a vector determined by the vector assigned to its parent node. We maintain a global counter variable c which is initialised to 1.
If the parent node is an OR gate labelled by the vector ⃗ v, then we label its children by ⃗ v. If the parent node is an AN D gate labelled by the vector ⃗ v, then we label its left child with vector ⃗ v|1 and the right child with the vector (0, . . . 0)| − 1, where (0, . . . , 0) denotes the zero vector of length c. Note that these two vectors sum to ⃗ v|0. Then we increment the value of c by 1. Once completing labelling the entire tree, the vectors labelling the leaf nodes form the rows of an LSSS matrix. If these vectors have different lengths, we pad the shorter with 0s at the end to arrive at vectors of the same length. Taking the predicate (B AN D C) )' as an example, the process of constructing the LSSS matrix is shown in Figure 2 . With the above method we can construct a matrix M of an claim-predicate Υ over a finite field F. We set M as an l × t matrix, where l is the length and t is the width (in the example shown in Figure 2 , l = 4 and t = 3). We set a labelling function u :
that associates each row of M with an input variable (x 1 , . . . , x n )∈ {0, 1} n . A span program accepts or rejects an input by the following criterion.
and (∀i : Let us consider another example Υ 2 :
The process of constructing the LSSS matrix is shown in Figure 3 . 
GO-ABS: definitions and security
In GO-ABS, we divide users into groups. Only members from the same group can merge their signing keys, but users from different groups cannot make it. In other words, users from the same group are able to cooperate with each other by producing ABS for a given predicate, but users from different groups cannot collude. The scheme is described as follows.
Let A be the universe of possible attributes. A claim-predicate over A is a monotone Boolean function, whose inputs are associated with attributes of A. We say that an attribute set A ⊆ A satisfies a claim-predicate Υ if Υ(A) = 1. And let G denote the collection of group identities: G = {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g N }. The framework is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Definition 3.1 (GO-ABS):
A GO-ABS scheme is parameterised by a universe of possible attributes A, a space of group identities G and message space M, and consists of the following algorithms.
1 GO-ABS.KeyGen: a GO-ABS.KeyGen.TSetup: (to be run by a signature trustee): Generates public reference information T P K.
b GO-ABS.KeyGen.ASetup: (to be run by an attribute-issuing authority): On input public reference T P K, generates a key pair {AP K, ASK}. AP K is the public key of the authority and published in the system, and ASK is the corresponding private key kept secret by the authority:
c GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen: On input ASK, a group identity g ∈ G, and an attribute set A ⊆ A, outputs a signing key SK
2 GO-ABS.Sign: On input public key P K = (T P K, AP K), a set of signing keys SK
. . , SK g AN } of the users (each with an attribute set A i ) from the same group g, a message m ∈ M, and a claim-predicate Υ where Υ(S) = 1:
, outputs a Boolean value.
{0, 1} ← GO-ABS.Ver (P K, m, Υ, σ).
If GO-ABS.Ver(P K, m, Υ, σ) = 1, we call the signature is valid. Otherwise the signature is invalid.
Correctness:
The verification algorithm outputs 1, if the signature is generated by users from the same group and the union of their attribute sets satisfies the predicate.
Definition 3.2 (Perfect Privacy):
A GO-ABS scheme is perfectly private if, for all honestly generated T P K ← GO-ABS.KeyGen.TSetup, all purported AP K, all unions of attribute sets S 1 (from Ai ← GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen (ASK, g 2 , A i ), all messages m, and all claim-predicates Υ such that Υ (S 1 ) = Υ(S 2 ) = 1, the distributions GO-ABS.Sign (P K, g 1 , SK
As in Maji et al. (2011) , we slightly overload notation and write GO-ABS.Sign(ASK, m, Υ) (i.e., supplant P K and SK g A with the attribute authority's private key ASK) to denote the following procedure: firstly run SK g A ← GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen (ASK, g, A) for any arbitrary A from any group g satisfying Υ; after that, get the output of GO-ABS.Sign (P K, g, SK g A , m, Υ). In the game below we use GO-ABS.Sign(ASK, m, Υ) to generate signatures requested by the adversary. This is reasonable when the scheme satisfies perfect privacy, since any other way of letting the adversary obtain signatures will result in the same distribution.
Definition 3.3 (Unforgeability):
Existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message and attribute set attacks for a GO-ABS scheme (GO-ABS.KeyGen, GO-ABS.Sign, and GO-ABS.Ver) is defined using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A:
1 Setup. The challenger C runs algorithm GO-ABS.KeyGen.TSetup and GO-ABS.KeyGen.ASetup to obtain a public reference information T P K and a key pair {AP K, ASK}.
The adversary A is given P K = (T P K, AP K).
2 Queries. A can adaptively query GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen Oracle and GO-ABS.Sign Oracle for a polynomially bounded times, and C answers these queries with ASK:
a GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen Oracle: A is allowed to query the signing key SK g A for any attribute set A ⊆ A and with membership of any group g ∈ G. And C responds to each query 
.e., the union of attribute sets (belong to g i ) queried to the GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen Oracle.
We define Adv SigA to be the probability that A wins in the above game. An adversary (t, q k , q s , ε) breaks a GO-ABS scheme if the adversary A runs in time at most t, and makes at most q k and q s times GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen Oracle queries and GO-ABS.Sign Oracle queries, while the advantage Adv SigA is at least ε. A GO-ABS scheme is (t, q k , q s , ε) existentially unforgeable if there is no forger that can (t, q k , q s , ε) break it.
We highlight the difference between ABS and GO-ABS: In ABS, users cannot collude to pool their attributes together. In other words, even if multiple users collude by merging their attributes (and the corresponding private keys), they cannot produce a signature to satisfy a predicate which none of them is able to satisfy individually. In contrast, GO-ABS introduces a relax that users from the same group can cooperate in signature generation: Users from the same group can produce a signature to satisfy a predicate which none of them is able to satisfy individually. This is captured by the above definition of unforgeability in GO-ABS.
Construction of GO-ABS scheme
In our construction, we use a group identity to label users from the same group such that users from the same group can merge their signing keys but users from different groups cannot make it. As described previously, the basic idea of our construction is to add group identities to reflect this feature. Instead of building a new signature scheme from scratch, we intend to enhance an existing construction by extending it with a group identity. Our construction is partially based on but not limited to Maji et al.'s (2011) construction. Below we give a description of our construction.
Our construction supports all claim-predicates whose monotone span programs have width at most t max , where t max is an arbitrary parameter. We let A = Z * p as the universe of attributes, where p is the size of the cyclic group used in the scheme.
1 GO-ABS.KeyGen:
a GO-ABS.KeyGen.TSetup: The signature trustee chooses suitable cyclic groups G and H of prime order p, equipped with a bilinear pairing
b GO-ABS.KeyGen.ASetup: Choose random a 0 , a, b, c ← Z * p and set:
The master key is ASK = (a 0 , a, b) and the public key AP K is (A 0 , . . . , A tmax , B 1 , . . . , B tmax , C) .
c GO-ABS.KeyGen.AttrGen: On input ASK, a group identity g ∈ G and an attribute set A ⊆ A, choose random generator K baseg ← G 1 labelling the group which the user belongs to. Set: 
The signing key is SK
e Pick random r 1 , . . . , r l ← Z p and compute:
3 GO-ABS.Ver: On input (P K, m, Υ, σ), first, the verifier converts Υ to its corresponding monotone span program M ∈ (Z p ) l×t , with row labelling
Otherwise, check the following constraints:
If all the above checks succeed, return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
Remark:
The given design of GO-ABS is based on many fundamental and complex cryptographic tools. But this will not bring many difficulties in usability, as most operations can be performed automatically. In more details, users only need to choose which attributes (in plain language) are used in the generation of GO-ABS, and the rest of calculations (such as the construction of the LSSS matrix and the generation of signatures) can be completed without any interactions from the end users. This helps to reduce security failures due to user errors.
Correctness can be seen by straight-forward substitutions, and is shown as follows.
is a valid signature of the message m for the predicate Υ, then
So, when j = 1,
Note that, if Υ(S) = 1, according to Section 2.2, we have
Security analysis
In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Our proposed GO-ABS scheme is a secure ABS scheme in the generic group model.
We break the security proof into two lemmas as follows.
Lemma 2: Our proposed GO-ABS scheme is a perfectly private (Definition 2) ABS scheme.
Proof: Giving σ = (Y, W, S 1 , . . . , S n , P 1 , . . . , P t ), it is easy to see that for any setting of Y ̸ = 1 and S 1 , . . . , S n , there is a unique value of W, P 1 , . . . , P t for which the signature successfully verifies. By observing that in GO-ABS.Sign, Y and S 1 , . . . , S n are distributed uniformly in their respective domains and that the signature output by GO-ABS.Sign successfully verifies, we can draw the conclusion: For any claim-predicate Υ and any union of attribute sets S that satisfies Υ, the output of GO-ABS.
for a random assignment of the formal variables. But we get the conclusion that these constraints can only hold with non-negligible probability if they hold with respect to the actual functions. We can assume that these constraints are functionally equivalent.
Eventually we can obtain a contradiction: there exists a k 0 ∈ [n] such that Υ(S k0 ) = 1. That is, the adversary has generated a signature legitimately with the signing key for S k0 , and thus the output is not a forgery. The concrete proof which illustrates this constraint is the same as the proof in Maji et al. (2011) .
Complexity analysis
This section aims to analyse the efficiency of the proposed GO-ABS scheme in terms of time complexity. The complexity of our algorithm is depending on different predicates: Different predicate have different time cost.
Efficiency:
The total public key data consists of 3(t m ax + 1) group elements. Signatures have linear size, which consists of l + t + 2 group elements (where l and t are the dimensions of he claim-predicate's monotone span program). Signature can be produced using a maximum of 2w + l(1 + 2t) + 3 exponentiations in G and H, where w is the minimum number of attributes needed for the signer to satisfy Υ. The simulation uses a 160-bit elliptic curve group based on the supersingular curve y 2 = x 3 + x over a 512-bit finite field (Lian et al., 2014) .
Simulation platform
We simulate the performance of GO-ABS by testing the time cost of various basic operations based on the pairing-based library (version 0.5.12) (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/). The details of the platform we use are shown in Table 1 . Figure 4 , we conclude that as the number of required attributes increases, the matrices will become more complex. In addition, as shown by Table 4 , the signing key size and the signature size of those different predicates are growing linearly (at the same security level as 1,024-bit RSA). Therefore, the resulting time cost drives up. 
No. Predicate
Υ1 (A AN D B) OR C Υ2 A AN D (D OR (B AN D C) ) Υ3 A AN D B AN D C AN D (D OR E) Υ4 A AN D B AN D C AN D D AN D (E OR F ) Υ5 A AN D B AN D C AN D D AN D E AN D F AN D G AN D H AN D I
Conclusions
We proposed a cooperative attribute-based access control mechanism. The core technology is a new primitive called GO-ABS. In the new notion, we introduced the concept of 'group': Users are divided into different groups. If they are from the same group, they can cooperate with each other by producing ABS for a given predicate satisfied by the union of their attribute sets. On the opposite side, users from different groups cannot collude. We also gave an efficient design by slightly extending Maji et al.'s ABS scheme. Our simulation result shows that our scheme is practical. We leave it as our future work to propose other designs of GO-ABS which outperforms the one presented in this paper. We believe our technology is particularly suitable for cooperative access control of cloud computing including private cloud system of small and medium enterprise (SME) and large public cloud of healthcare system.
